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Abstract
Historians of the First Stadholderless Period (1650-1672) have shown that suppor-
ters of the house of Orange evoked memories of Prince William i of Orange’s role 
in the Revolt of the Netherlands in support of their political agendas. Jill Stern has 
recently argued that the supporters of True Freedom  therefore needed to develop 
an alternative interpretation of the Revolt. Since she focuses on Orangist rhetoric, 
she has not asked why authors who sympathized with the States Party related their 
political ideology to the existing popular historical narratives about the conflict. 
These were, after all, tainted by Orangist associations. This article will argue that 
the past was a rich source of inspiration for politicians in the seventeenth-century 
‘present’ but that the use of historical references was limited by the existing domi-
nant storylines.
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Historians have contended that the political usage of references to the Revolt of the 
Netherlands (1566-1648) had its real origin in the eighteenth century. They consider 
the rise of interest in national history a phenomenon of the Enlightenment and, in the 
Dutch context, the result of a growing popular awareness of real or imaginary econo-
mic and moral decline. I. Leonard Leeb, for example, has shown that revolutionaries 
and their opponents at the end of the eighteenth century revived popular interest in 
the national past to cloak their arguments ‘with the wisdom of age and the sanctity of 
precedent’.1 Joop Koopmans has demonstrated that rivalling Orangist and Patriot facti-
ons in the 1780s used memories of the Revolt in their political struggles.2 And Wijnand 
Mijnhardt and Margaret Jacob have argued that a widespread feeling of decline in the 
eighteenth century ‘produced a new national consciousness that drew its inspiration 
from the past’.3 These scholars suggest that the politicization of national history was a 
new development in the eighteenth century.
Pieter Geyl and G.O. van de Klashorst, and more recently Judith Pollmann, Jill 
Stern and Ingmar Vroomen, however, have revealed that the political deployment of 
the national past was not very new in the eighteenth or nineteenth century. They have 
shown that supporters of the house of Orange (which had played a leading role in the 
sixteenth-century struggle against the Habsburg overlord) and their adversaries (who 
disapproved of the princes of Orange having political influence) prolifically comme-
morated the Revolt of the Netherlands in the seventeenth century.4 Furthermore, 
* I would like to thank Judith Pollmann and Mark Leon de Vries for helpful comments.
1 I. Leonard Leeb, The ideological origins of the Batavian Revolution. History and politics in the Dutch Republic 
1747-1800, The Hague 1973, p. 4-5.
2 J.W. Koopmans, ‘Spanish tyranny and bloody placards. Historical commonplaces in the struggle between 
Dutch Patriots and Orangists around 1780?’, in: J.W. Koopmans and N.H. Petersen (eds), Commonplace 
culture in Western Europe in the early modern period iii. Legitimation of antiquity, Leuven 2011, p. 35-36, 54.
3 M.C. Jacob and W.W. Mijnhardt, ‘Introduction’, in: Jacob and Mijnhardt (eds), The Dutch Republic in the 
eighteenth century. Decline, Enlightenment, and revolution, Ithaca (ny) 1992, p. 13; see also J. Kloek and W. Mijn-
hardt, 1800. Blauwdrukken voor een samenleving, The Hague 2001, p. 213-221.
4 P. Geyl, ‘Het stadhouderschap in de partijliteratuur onder De Witt’, in: P. Geyl (ed.), Pennestrijd over Staat 
en Historie, Groningen 1971, originally published in 1947, p. 3-71; G.O. van de Klashorst, ‘ “Metten schijn 
van monarchie getempert”. De verdediging van het stadhouderschap in de partijliteratuur, 1650-1686’, in: 
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Judith Pollmann has demonstrated that anti-peace propagandists used references to 
the first decades of the Revolt, the 1560s, 70s and 80s, to convince the population of 
Spain’s unreliability and to mobilize as many people as possible against peace. This 
political exploitation of the past at the beginning of the seventeenth century resulted 
in a popular historical canon, a sequential narrative that reduced the conflict to the 
bare essentials of Dutch victimhood and Spanish evil.5 Recurring episodes in the 
canon were, for instance, the religious persecutions of Philip ii in the 1550s and 60s, 
the indigenous nobility’s plea for moderation of the religious placards (1566), and the 
unpopular governorship of Fernando Álvarez de Tolédo, duke of Alba (1567-1573).6 
For the narrative to serve an anti-peace political agenda, it needed to be relatively tole-
rant in its coverage and interpretation of past events, which explains why most political 
references to the Revolt published in the Republic were fiercely anti-Spanish but 
not characterized foremost by a distinctly anti-Catholic tone. With a substantial part 
of the population still adhering to Catholicism, such an approach would be counter-
productive.7 The canonical narrative lost this open character, however, when it became 
contested in the domestic struggles between two factions within the Reformed church 
during the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609-1621). Due to the ultimate victory of the ortho-
dox Counter-Remonstrant faction, and of their protector Prince Maurice of Orange, 
the historical canon of the Revolt acquired Orangist as well as orthodox Calvinist 
associations.8
Stern demonstrates that when the provincial States barred the orphaned son 
of   William ii of Orange (1626-1650), Prince William iii, from the stadholderate during 
the First Stadholderless Period (1650-1672),9 the new order had ‘to pass judgement on 
H.W. Blom and I.W. Wildenberg (eds), Pieter de la Court in zijn tijd (1618-1685). Aspecten van een veelzijdig 
publicist, Amsterdam 1986; J. Pollmann, Het oorlogsverleden van de Gouden Eeuw, Leiden 2008, p. 6-15; J. Stern, 
Orangism in the Dutch Republic in word and image, 1650-1675, Manchester 2010, p. 160-165; I. Vroomen, ‘Taal 
van de Republiek. Het gebruik van vaderlandretoriek in Nederlandse pamfletten, 1618-1672’, doctoral the-
sis, Rotterdam 2012, http://repub.eur.nl/res/pub/32307/ (accessed on 8 June 2013), p. 142-158; W. Frijhoff 
and M. Spies, 1650. Hard-won unity, Assen 2004, p. 556-557.
5 J. Pollmann, ‘No man’s land. Reinventing Netherlandish identities, 1585-1621’, in: R. Stein and J. Poll-
mann (eds), Networks, regions and nations. Shaping identities in the Low Countries, 1300-1650, Leiden 2010, 
p. 251-258; J.van der Steen, ‘Goed en fout tijdens de Nederlandse Opstand’, in: Holland, Historisch Tijdschrift 
43.2 (2011), p. 82-96.
6 S. Schama, The embarrassment of riches. An interpretation of Dutch culture in the golden age, London 1987, p. 86.
7 Ch.H. Parker, Faith on the margins. Catholics and Catholicism in the Dutch Golden Age, Cambridge (ma) 2008, 
p. 1-23; C. Kooi, Calvinists and Catholics during Holland’s Golden Age. Heretics and idolaters, Cambridge 2012, 
p. 30-33.
8 C. Lenarduzzi, ‘ “De oude geusen teghen de nieuwe geusen”. De dynamiek van het oorlogsverleden ten 
tijde van het Twaalfjarig Bestand’, in: Holland, Historisch Tijdschrift 43.2 (2011), p. 65-81; J. van der Steen, ‘A 
contested past. Memory wars during the Twelve Years’ Truce (1609-21)’, in: E. Kuijpers et al. (eds), Memory 
before modernity. Practices of memory in early modern Europe, Leiden 2013.
9 A stadholder was a provincial governor originally appointed by the sovereign prince but ever since the 
Revolt formally employed by the state assemblies. The Orange dynasty provided most of the stadholders 
after the abjuration of the Spanish king Philip ii in 1581. See R. Fruin, Geschiedenis der staatsinstellingen in 
Nederland tot den val der Republiek, ed. H.T. Colenbrander, The Hague 1980, p. 218-224.
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the practices of the old regime […]. The “canon” of accepted truths about the national 
past was changed in order to reflect and emphasise new political realities’.10 Opponents 
of the house of Orange, members of what historians call the States Party (also known 
as supporters of ‘True Freedom’), hence reinterpreted the past rebellion against the 
Spanish king in their attempts to marginalize the young prince of Orange, William iii, 
and his supporters.11 But spreading an anti-Orangist reading of the past could be quite 
a challenge. Looking back on the continued references to the past during the disorders 
and troubles at the time of the First Anglo-Dutch War (1652-1654), which was lost by 
the Republic, diplomat and historian Lieuwe van Aitzema explained how clergymen 
in particular deliberately propagated the dominant Orangist reading of the past. He 
wrote that Orangist propagandists felt it was necessary:
for reason of State / on the Chair / during meals / in Barges / and on Carts to tell / yes for child-
ren to learn at their mother’s knee that a hundred thousand were killed for the sake of religion / 
that the Duke of Alba had prided himself on killing eighteen thousand [...] And the history of one 
hundred thousand, and of eighteen thousand put often on the stage / served to move the people to 
endurance and perseverance. It would well-nigh be idolatry / should one not believe it.12
Stern’s argument that the supporters of True Freedom needed to develop an alterna-
tive interpretation of the Revolt convinces in many respects, but since she focuses on 
Orangist rhetoric she has not asked why authors who sympathized with the States 
Party felt obliged to relate their political ideology to the existing popular historical 
narratives about the conflict. These were, after all, tainted by Orangist associations and, 
furthermore, opponents of the Orange dynasty already had a wide repertoire of alter-
native ways to argue why the Republic did not need the house of Orange. Holland’s 
history of independence and the Batavian Myth – a fictional story about the proto-
Dutch Batavian people who fiercely fought the Roman Empire – both suggested 
Dutch people disliked over-ambitious princely rulers and that they were historically 
capable of resisting a foreign tyrant without an Orange prince as stadholder. Anti-
Orangist propagandists frequently deployed such alternative frames of reference.13
10 Stern, Orangism (n. 4), p. 157.
11 Ibidem, p. 157-160; G. van der Plaat calls this reinterpretation of the past an ‘anti-Orange myth’: G. van 
der Plaat, Eendracht als opdracht. Lieuwe van Aitzema’s bijdrage aan het publieke debat in de zeventiende-eeuwse 
Republiek, Hilversum 2003, p. 164-165; for an overview of the term ‘party’ in the seventeenth-century 
Dutch Republic, see D.J. Roorda, Partij en factie. De oproeren van 1672 in de steden van Holland en Zeeland, een 
krachtmeting tussen partijen en facties, Groningen 1978, p. 1-10. 
12 L. van Aitzema, Saken van Staet, In, ende omtrent de Vereenigde Nederlanden, Beginnende met het Jaer 1645, ende 
eyndigende met het Jaer 1656, The Hague 1669, p. 1234: ‘om reden van Staet / op den Stoel / op maeltijden 
/ in Schuyten / en op Wagens te segghen / ja de kinderen met haer pap in te geven dat hondert duysent 
waren om het geloove omgebracht / dat Duc d’Alba alleen sich hadde geroemt van achtien duysent. […] 
Ende de historie van hondert duysent, ende achtien duysent menighmael op het Toneel ghebracht / heeft 
ghedient om de gemeente te bewegen tot lijdtsaemheydt ende stantvastigheyt. Ende ’t soude bykans een 
afgoderye zijn / soo men ’t niet gelooft.’; see also Van der Plaat, Eendracht, p. 73.
13 I. Schöffer, ‘The Batavian Myth during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries’, in: J.S. Bromley and 
E.H. Kossmann (eds), Britain and the Netherlands. Papers delivered to the fifth Anglo-Dutch historical conference, 
vol. v, Some political mythologies, The Hague 1975, p. 78-101; an example of Holland’s appropriation of the 
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The present article will explore 1) why, despite the pro-Orange character of the 
historical canon of the Revolt, members of the States Party nonetheless used references 
to the Revolt in support of their political arguments, and 2) how they solved the pro-
blems they encountered in doing so. Two cases will be dealt with: firstly, the aftermath 
of William ii’s attack on Amsterdam (1650-1651) and, secondly, the political controversy 
surrounding the Exclusion Act of 1654.
Reinterpreting the Revolt
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 formally ended the Eighty Years’ War, and it occa-
sioned a disagreement about the dismissal of troops: now that the war was over, many 
Holland regents urged a reduction of troops to relieve the tax burden. Other provinces 
as well as the stadholder Prince William ii were less keen on Holland’s plan, fearing its 
implementation might weaken the Republic. The prince and his supporters believed 
that Dutch people profited from war because the shared enemy had kept the country 
together.14 The example of the Twelve Years’ Truce, when confessional struggles had 
brought the country to the verge of civil war, was still fresh in the public memory.15 
To give an example of how memories of the Revolt continued to be used after 1648 
to support the anti-peace agenda of Orangists we may turn to printer Jan Pietersz in 
Haarlem who in 1653 brought on the market a new edition of an old pamphlet: Use-
ful Comments on the Spanish Council.16 It contained the advice allegedly given to the 
Spanish king Philip ii at the end of the sixteenth century by three learned men, Justus 
Lipsius, Erycius Puteanus and Friar Campanella. As the story goes, they had urged 
Philip to negotiate a peace with the rebels so that the Dutch could be lulled to sleep. 
The king would subsequently need only to coordinate a surprise attack to bring the 
disobedient provinces back under his rule. A ‘True Patriot’ argued in the preface of the 
Batavian past, see H. Grotius, Tractaet vande ovdtheyt vande Batavische nv Hollandsche republique, The Hague 
1610, and also E. Kolfin, ‘Past imperfect. Political ideals in the unfinished Batavian series for the Town Hall 
of Amsterdam’, in: M. van der Zwaag and R. Cohen Tervaert (eds), Opstand als opdracht. The Batavian com-
missions, Amsterdam 2011, p. 10-19; for the use of Holland’s medieval past by supporters of True Freedom, 
see for instance P. de la Court, Interest van Holland, ofte gronden van Hollands-Welvaren, Amsterdam 1662, fol. 
6v-7r, p. 188-206; for Holland’s pride of independence, see L. Panhuysen, De Ware Vrijheid. De levens van 
Johan en Cornelis de Witt, Amsterdam 2005, p. 86-87.
14 Frijhoff and Spies, 1650 (n. 4), p. 140; William ii considered war as an important source of prestige, see 
H.H. Rowen, The Princes of Orange. The Stadholders in the Dutch Republic, Cambridge 1990, first published in 
1988, p. 79-83.
15 Stern, Orangism, p. 165-176.
16 Anonymous, Dienstige aenmerkingen op den Spaensen raedt, eertijds door Justus Lipsius [...] gegeven aende 
koninck van Spaengien, hoe men de Vereenichde Nederlanden alderbest wederom onder zijn gebiedt soude konnen 
brenghen, Haarlem 1653, Kn(uttel collection) 7451, see W.P.C. Knuttel (ed.), Catalogus van de pamfletten-
verzameling berustende in de Koninklijke Bibliotheek, vol. 2.2, The Hague 1978; this pamphlet is an edition of a 
text published in 1617: Anonymous, Spaenschen raedt, hoemen de vereenichde Nederlanden alderbest wederom sal 
konnen brenghen onder’t ghebiedt van den koninck van Spagnien, s.l. 1617, Kn. 2458.
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1653-edition that the war should be resumed, and he tried to convince his readers by 
refreshing the memory of the untrustworthiness of the Spanish. Yet, he admitted that 
not even those of ‘the smallest intellect’ needed much informing about all the obstacles 
that had led to the foundation of the Republic, indicating the lively memory culture 
about the Revolt, especially among old people for whom ‘there is not a sweeter pas-
time […] / than when they may speak about the old times’.17
In arguing their case, opponents of Holland’s desire for the dismissal of troops turned 
to the most important constitutional document of the Republic, the Union of Utrecht 
(1579), which laid down that the military was a matter not for the individual provinces 
but for the States General. Holland could thus not simply discharge the military regi-
ments on its own. According to Holland, however, this interpretation of the Union of 
Utrecht was acceptable only in war time, whereas now that the war was over, doubt 
had arisen about the Union’s constitutional status. Since there was no central financial 
administration in the Republic and individual provinces were responsible for paying 
the troops allocated to them (‘apportionment’), the States of Holland could decide 
unilaterally to suspend the payments to their regiments, which they did.18 In reaction 
to this measure, and citing his oath to uphold the Union, Prince William ii arrested six 
members of the States of Holland who sympathized with the States Party and tried 
to take by force the most powerful engine behind Holland’s opposition to the prince: 
the city of Amsterdam. The attack failed as a number of companies lost their way. A 
courier from Hamburg had seen the troops and notified Amsterdam’s magistrate of 
the imminent arrival of a large army. The city subsequently locked its gates and could 
no longer be taken by surprise. A few months after the failed attack, the prince died 
unexpectedly.19 Although William ii’s only son was born eight days after his father’s 
death, Holland and the other provinces decided to leave the stadholderly office vacant 
and not to appoint the young William iii, or any other member of the Orange dynasty, 
as their new stadholder.20
William’s sudden death prompted the States General to convene the Great Assembly 
of 1651 to find a durable solution for the dismissal of troops and other disagreements 
about the Union.21 Representatives from all provinces of the Republic attended the 
assembly, which was held in the Great Hall of the Binnenhof (‘Inner Court’) in The 
Hague. Grand Pensionary Jacob Cats opened the first meeting in January 1651. In a 
17 Anonymous, Dienstige aenmerkingen, p. 4-5: ‘aldergeringhsten van verstandt’; ‘Daer is geen soeter liefko-
serie voor oude luyden / als datse van den ouden tijdt moghen spreecken’.
18 More about ‘apportionment’ or ‘repartitie’, see Fruin, Geschiedenis der staatsinstellingen (n. 9), p. 190-191; 
Rowen, The Princes of Orange, p. 84.
19 For the prince’s actions in 1650, see G.W. Kernkamp, Prins Willem ii, 1626-1650, Amsterdam 1977, first 
published in 1943, p. 97-146.
20 Friesland employed a different stadholder, William Frederick of Nassau, a cousin of William ii. He 
remained in office in this province and on William ii’s death also became stadholder of Groningen and 
Drenthe.
21 The interest in the Union of Utrecht around 1650 is evidenced by the fact that at least seven editions 
of the tract were printed in that year alone; Frijhoff and Spies, 1650 (n. 4), p. 77.
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speech that was later published, Cats thanked God ‘that this solemn Assembly could 
be held in a place where formerly [in 1581] the King of Spain was abjured, his yoke 
thrown off, and the grounds laid for the Liberty of these Lands’.22 It is not inconceiva-
ble that the grand pensionary looked up when he continued: ‘where the Trophies and 
the marks of the Victory granted from time to time by the merciful God to this State, 
are hanging above everyone’s head’ (fig. 1).23 
To Holland’s satisfaction, the Great Assembly confirmed the sovereignty of the pro-
vinces. Yet it did not solve the continuing tensions between provincial autonomy and 
the delegation of authority to the Union. Already well before the assembly had begun, 
supporters of True Freedom and Orangist propagandists had fought out a media war.24 
In their political arguments in the ‘present’, both parties claimed to act in the spi-
rit of the past Revolt against the Habsburg overlord. The well-known anti-Orangist 
pamphlet  Holland Talk, which was published shortly after William ii’s attack, conside-
red the actions of the prince as an unacceptable break with the moral legacy of the 
Revolt. The author for example suggested that William ii had treated the cities of 
Holland ‘as if they were cities of the King of Spain’.25 In the pamphlet, four people 
from Gelderland,  Holland, Friesland and Brabant discuss the prince’s recent coup. Hol-
land decries  William ii for ‘doing everything to the city [Amsterdam], that an enemy 
would be able to do’.26 In reaction to the Gelderlander’s accusation that Holland had 
acted unconstitutionally in the matter of the disbanding of the troops, the Hollander 
explains that ‘The seven provinces are united / or connected to each other / but it 
is not a single body / only in matters of war’. He cites the first article of the Union 
(which, as he points out, gave the Republic its name of ‘United Provinces’ – in the 
plural) as evidence that the provinces delegated their sovereignty to the States General 
only because of the war.27 Since the war was over and the basis for such collaboration 
22 J. Cats, Anvanck vande Groote Vergaderinge der Vereenichde Nederlanden, Leiden 1651, Kn. 7029, fol. 2r: ‘dat 
dese solemnele Vergaderinge mach werden gehouden in eene plaetse / daer eertijts den Koninck van 
Spaignen is af gesworen / syn Jock verworpen / en de Gronden vande Vryheyt deser Landen zyn geleyt’.
23 Ibidem: ‘Daer de Trophëen ende Zegel-teeckenen / vande Victorien by den goedertieren Godt aen 
desen Staet van tijt tot tijt genadelijck verleent, over yders hooft […] zyn swevende’.
24 Several historians have studied this media war, including many of the texts covered by this article. See 
Van der Plaat, Eendracht als opdracht (n. 11), p. 143-173; C. Dingemanse, Rap van tong, scherp van pen. Literaire 
discussiecultuur in Nederlandse praatjespamfletten (circa 1600-1750), Hilversum 2008, p. 99-179; Stern, Orangism 
(n. 4), p. 84-105; R. Harms, Pamfletten en publieke opinie. Massamedia in de zeventiende eeuw, Amsterdam 2011, 
p. 91-127; Vroomen, ‘Taal van de Republiek’ (n. 4), p. 119-163.
25 Anonymous, Hollants praatjen, tusschen vier personen [...] aangaande de souverainiteyt van syn hoogheyt, Ant-
werp 1650, fol. a2r: ‘als of het de Steden van den Koning van Spangien waren’. The author claims he had 
the text printed in Antwerp in the Southern Netherlands to evade censorship or public censure, but as 
Clazina Dingemans has shown, this was probably a rhetorical trick to show that the supporters of the prince 
violated the freedoms of the land so that the author had to turn to Antwerp in the Habsburg Netherlands 
to express his opinions; Dingemanse, Rap van tong, scherp van pen, p. 162-163.
26 Anonymous, Hollants praatjen, fol. a2r: ‘Hy heeft alles aen de Stadt gedaen / wat een vyand soude kon-
nnen doen’.
27 Ibidem, fol. a4r: ‘De seven Provintien zijn wel geunieert / of t’samen verbonden / maer ’t en is geen 
een lichaem / dan in’t stuck van d’oorloge […] Men noemtse Seven vereenigde Landen, of Provincien’.
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had disappeared, Holland had every right to act as it did and was justified even within 
the confines of the Union. 
In response to the Gelderlander’s question whether the prince’s attack on Amsterdam 
should really be taken so seriously, the Hollander replies: ‘Yes, it is of great signifi-
cance / that the Old Lord Prince of Orange [...] his Highness’ Grandfather, judged / 
that the Duke of Anjou, then Duke of Brabant / for that reason forfeited his duke-
dom’.28 Here the Hollander draws a parallel between past and present by highlighting 
the high-handed attempt of Francis, duke of Anjou, who had been appointed as sove-
reign by the rebels in 1581 but was given so little power that he became frustrated and 
tried to seize Antwerp in 1583. As a result, the States General no longer recognized the 
duke as their sovereign. By evoking this historical example, the author of Holland Talk 
showed that it was not impossible to appropriate the memory of   William i while cri-
ticizing his grandson William ii. To further emphasize that William ii acted even more 
28 Ibidem, fol. a2v: ‘Ja/ daer is so veel aengelegen / dat de Ouden Heere Prince van Oraignien, hooghloff. 
gedach. Sijn Hoogheyts Groot-vader, oordeelde / dat den Hertog van Alençon [i.e. Anjou], doe Hertog van 
Brabant / om die oorsaeck / was vervallen van zijn recht van’t Hertogdom’.
Fig. 1 Bartholomeus van Bassen, The Great Hall of the Inner Court (‘Binnenhof ’) in The Hague during the 
Great Assembly of the States General of 1651, c. 1651, sk-c-1350, Rijksmuseum Amsterdam.
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despicably than Anjou, the Hollander argues that ‘here there is no Sovereign / but a 
Stadholder; here there is no Parliament that is called by the Sovereign and / when he 
pleases /  dissolved. Here there are States / who stand in their own right / and who 
acknowledge no one as a higher lord’.29 Although Anjou had acted reprehensibly, at 
least he did so as a sovereign. William ii was merely a stadholder, which meant his con-
duct was even more unconstitutional. A similar argument can be found in the Right 
Second Part of the Holland Talk, in which a Brabanter claims that William ii surpassed 
even the duke of Alba in wickedness. The Gelderlander is shocked by this statement: 
‘I don’t know how the gentleman from Brabant can substantiate that [claim] / that 
the Prince could be compared to the duke of Alba, the cruelest Tyrant of the World’. 
The Brabanter subsequently explains that Alba acted on the orders of his natural lord, 
Philip ii, while William ii counteracted the orders of his, the States of Holland.30
The published fictional dialogues between Dutch people from all corners of the 
Republic demonstrate how authors sought to increase the persuasiveness of their 
argument by involving people with diverging opinions and then having the author’s 
opinion prevail – in this case the Hollander’s.31 Another good example is the anti-
Orangist The Hague Shoptalk, published after the death of William ii and at the time of 
the Great Assembly. Four men (a Hollander, a Zeelander, a Frisian and a Groninger) 
gather in a bookshop in The Hague and discuss the political situation. The Groninger 
has just entered and asks for news, specifically for tidings from France or England. The 
Hollander answers that they were not talking about England or France but about ‘the 
great changes which / now for a year / or a bit more time / occurred in these United 
Provinces’.32 He thanks God for the positive turn events had taken – William ii died 
at the end of 1650 – and he says ‘I cannot see that for the duration / that we were at 
war with the King of Spain / we had ever so great a victory / as now a year ago’.33 
The Hollander considers the death of Prince William to be the best thing that has ever 
happened to the Republic. The Groninger does not quite understand this celebration 
of the prince’s death and proposes to discuss the matter further.34 After the unsuccess-
ful attack on Amsterdam, the prince and the States had reached an agreement about 
disbanding the troops. Was it not a bit cruel to celebrate William’s death as a triumph? 
29 Ibidem, fol. a3r: ‘hier is geen Souverain, maar een Stadhouder; hier is geen Parlement dat van een Sou-
verain geroepen wert / en / als’t hem belieft / weder moet scheyden. Maer hier sijn Staten, die uyt haer 
selven bestaen / en die / boven haer / niemant en kennen’. 
30 Anonymous, Het rechte tweede deel, van’t Hollands praatje, verdedigende het recht van de [...] Staten van Hol-
landt en West-Vrieslandt, Antwerp 1650, p 6. :‘Ick weet niet waer dien Brabandschen Heer dat vast soude 
maken / dat den Prince in vergelijckinge soude komen met Ducq d’Alf, den wreedsten Tyran van de 
Werelt’.
31 Dingemanse, Rap van tong (n. 24), p. 130-139.
32 Anonymous, Haagsch vvinkel-praatje, oft Gesprek, voor-gevallen in den Hage, tusschen vier personen [...] nopende 
de amnestie, dank, en vier-dag, Leeuwarden: Claude Fonteyne, 1651, Kn. 7039, p. 3: ‘de groote veranderingen / 
nu in een jaar / of wat meer tijds / in dese Vereenigde Provincien voor-ghevallen’.
33 Ibidem, p. 4: ‘dat ik niet en kan sien dat wy soo lang / als wy met den Koning van Spaignien in oorloog 
hebben geweest / oyt soo grooten zegen en victorie gehad hebben / als nu een jaar herwaerts’.
34 Ibidem, p. 4.
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The Hollander explains that just before his death, the prince was as bellicose as ever. 
His death may have been tragic, but ultimately it benefitted the country.35
To prove his point, the Hollander teaches a brief history lesson in which he gives a 
new spin to existing narratives about the Revolt. He refers to the sixteenth-century 
past to show that from the greatest evil good things could arise. He recalls a series of 
events, beginning with the religious persecutions under Philip ii. These persecutions 
violated local privileges, but the positive result was public discontent. Discontent in 
the 1560s was the prelude to the grand-scale Revolt, which ultimately gave rise to the 
freedom that people enjoyed ‘now’. The next episode in the story of the Hollander 
is the governorship of the duke of Alba at the end of the 1560s and beginning of the 
1570s. The frequent references to his oppressive tribunal, the Council of Troubles, in 
a variety of media show that by 1650 the duke was still an example capable of evo-
king strong associations with injustice. But although Alba was perceived as wicked, his 
regime had strengthened the rebels in their convictions and had motivated them to 
continue fighting. Then the Hollander arrives at the famous capture of Den Briel by 
the rebels in 1572. When ‘the Queen of England denied entry to the Sea Beggars (as 
people called them) / since she had peace with the King of Spain; this seemed a very 
evil sign / but it was the beginning of our deliverance / as the new beggars […] not 
knowing where to harbour / came to Den Briel’.36 The capture of Den Briel was the 
first rebel take-over of a city, and it was followed by other cities siding with the rebels.
The Hollander continues enumerating the canonical episodes of the history of the 
Revolt, such as the atrocities committed by Spanish soldiers in Rotterdam (1572), 
 Zutphen (1572), Naarden (1572) and Haarlem (1573). In most narratives, authors used 
these episodes as evidence of the cruel nature of Spanish rulers and to justify the war 
against Spain.37 The Hollander looks at it from a more positive perspective. When they 
were besieged in 1573-1574, inhabitants of the cities of Alkmaar and Leiden knew about 
the cruelties committed in other towns and were so horrified by them that they refu-
sed to surrender and were willing to fight until the very end. This proved to be the best 
strategy, and both cities fought off the Spanish army. The Hollander ends with the mur-
der of William of Orange by Balthasar Gérard in 1584: ‘Then everyone thought the 
Land was lost; but it was a great blessing for the Land’.38 In 1584, the States of  Holland 
had intended to make the prince count of Holland ‘as a result of which we would 
35 Ibidem, p. 4-5.
36 Ibidem, p. 15: ‘de Koninginne van Engeland de Water-geusen (soo men die noemde) haer land  ontseyd / 
alsoo sy met den Koning van Spaignien vrede had; ’t welk een seer quaat teyken scheen te zijn / en ’t was 
’t begin van onse verlossing / alsoo die nieuwe geusen […] niet wetende waer sy souden  havenen / in den 
Briel quamen’.
37 See for instance the history of the Revolt Spieghel der Ievght (1614) which was republished  throughout the 
seventeenth century; W. Cilleßen, ‘Der Spiegel der Jeugd. Ein Kinderbuch als Medium der Geschichtser-
innerung in den Niederlanden (1614-1813)’, in: H. Peterse (ed.), Süß scheint der Krieg den Unerfahrenen. Das 
Bild vom Krieg und die Utopie des Friedens in der Frühen Neuzeit, Göttingen 2004, p. 60-62.
38 Anonymous, Haagsch vvinkel-praatje, p. 15: ‘Doe meende elk dat het Land verlooren was; en het was een 
groote zegen voor ’t Land’.
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have changed Lord / but not condition / as we would not have been better off with 
Orange than with Spain: so his death brings us more good / than evil’.39
Memory politics and the Exclusion
The analysis of a number of important texts published in 1650-1651 and written by 
adherents of True Freedom has revealed that States Party propagandists apparently 
considered it useful to refer to the Revolt in their political texts, even though this 
required a constant and sometimes laborious reinterpretation of the dominant histori-
cal canon.40 To further illustrate the difficulty of using references to the Revolt while 
casting off the dominant Orangist interpretation of the past, it is worthwhile to look 
at the Exclusion Act, a secret agreement between Stadholderless Holland and Com-
monwealth England that was part of the treaty that ended the First Anglo-Dutch War 
(1652-1654): the Treaty of Westminster. In signing the Exclusion Act, Holland succum-
bed to pressures from England’s Protector Oliver Cromwell never to appoint the son of 
William ii as stadholder. Cromwell’s demand was informed by the fact that the young 
prince of Orange was a nephew of the exiled king Charles ii. Should this William iii 
become stadholder of the powerful Dutch Republic, he might eventually help restore 
his uncle as king of England. Holland had signed the secret clause without consulting 
the States General, thereby angering Orangists at home and in the other provinces of 
the Republic.41 The States of Friesland, for instance, complained at the States General 
about this act which they felt slighted the descendant of ‘the lord Prince William the 
Elder […] whose bones are with us in Delft buried beneath a tomb, in his honour and 
in his eternal memory, erected by the State itself ’.42 By mentioning a physical reminder 
of William of Orange, namely his tomb, the States of Friesland sought to convince the 
delegates in the States General of the gratitude that was owed to the Orange dynasty. 
Excluding the current prince of Orange from public office was, they felt, the worst 
kind of ingratitude.
39 Ibidem, p. 15: ‘daer door wy wel van Heer souden verandert hebben / maer niet van Conditie / alsoo 
wy geen beter souden gehad hebben aen Oraignien, als aan Spaignien: soo dat die dood ons meer goed / 
als quaat dede’.
40 For other examples of this challenge, see anonymous, I. Conferentie, van eenige Nederlandtsche heeren, op 
den tegenwoordigen staet deser landen, Middelburg 1651, Kn. 6899, fol. a2v, c1r; anonymous, Openhertig discours, 
tusschen een Hollander, een Zeeuw, een Vries, ende een Over-ysselaar, rakende de subite dood van sijn hoogheyd prins 
VVilhelm, Rotterdam 1651, Kn. 7040, fol. a2r-v.
41 G. de Bruin, ‘Political pamphleteering and public opinion’, in: F. Deen et al. (eds), Pamphlets and politics 
in the Dutch Republic, Leiden 2011, p. 81.
42 Cited in L. van Aitzema, Historie of Verhael van Saken van staet en Oorlogh, in, ende ontrent de Vereenigde 
Nederlanden, beginnende met ’t uytgaen vanden Treves, The Hague 1663, p. 110: ‘De Heer Prins Willem de Oude 
[…] wiens Beenderen noch by ons tot Delft, onder een Graft t’sijner eeren, ende tot een eeuwige Memorie 
bij den Staet self gedaen maecken […] begraven leggen’.
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Most Orangist publications of the period argued that gratitude was owed to the 
Orange dynasty.43 To give one other example, during the Exclusion controversy in 
1654 poet Johannes Beuken wrote a poem in honour of the house of Orange-Nassau, 
and he dedicated it to the Magistrate of the city of Leiden. In his dedication he wrote: 
‘What Netherlander is not most highly obliged to the serene House of Nassau? That 
House to which we owe, apart from God, our freedom’.44 Here the author referred to 
the Revolt and in particular to William of Orange’s role in the rebellion. By success-
fully fighting off the Spanish king from 1566 onwards, the rebels (led by Orange) had 
laid the first stone of a new state: the Dutch Republic. After exhorting his readers to 
praise the house of Orange, Beuken gave a poetic account of important sieges, battles 
and other events from the beginning of the Revolt in 1566 to the Peace of Westpha-
lia in 1648 and beyond. The author claimed that what had happened during the war 
against Spain was ‘known to virtually all’. Yet, he advised anyone ‘who does not know, 
[to] read Emanuel van Meteren and other memoirists’.45 Furthermore, for the readers 
who were less familiar with the historical narrative, Beuken clarified names and dates 
in explanatory footnotes.46
Due to the widespread criticism of the Exclusion, notably by Zeeland and Friesland, 
Holland’s grand pensionary Johan de Witt wrote a defence of this measure: the Deduc-
tion. The English ambassador in The Hague observed that the text was ‘as big as half the 
bible’ and although this was an exaggeration, it took the grand pensionary five hours 
to deliver his Deduction on 6 August 1654 in the assembly of the States General.47 In it, 
De Witt argued that political power should not be a birth right and that the monar-
chical presence of the princes of Orange as stadholders was incompatible with the 
state’s republican constitution. These were fundamental principles, yet De Witt used 
historical precedents, especially the Revolt, to argue more convincingly why Holland 
was justified in denying the young Prince William iii the right to succeed as stadholder. 
He posed the rhetorical question: ‘has not the most important matter that has occurred 
in these Netherlands in people’s remembrance or the memory of histories taught us 
43 See also Van de Klashorst, ‘ “Metten schijn” ’ (n. 4), p. 100; Stern, Orangism (n. 4), p. 68-74, 160-161.
44 J. Beuken, ‘Orangiens en Nassouwse Louwer-krans’, in: Rijmen, verdeeld in Drie Boekken, als 1. minne-
dichten. 2. veelderley. 3. Bybel-werk, Leiden 1668, fol. l1r: ‘wat Nederlanders is niet ten hoogsten verplicht aan 
dat doorluchtige Huys van Nassouw? dat Huys aan wien wy (naast God) onse Vryheyd schuldig zijn’.
45 Ibidem, fol. l9r: ‘is yder by na bekend. Die het niet en weet, lese Emanuel van Métre en andre Gedenk-
Schrijvers’; Emanuel van Meteren (1535-1612) was an influential historian of the Revolt.
46 The widespread Orangist appeals to the Revolt to exhort people to feel gratitude towards the house 
of Orange are well-evidenced and include: anonymous, Bedenckingen | op de deductie van de [...] Staten van 
Hollandt, noopende den artijckel van seclusie, van den heere prince van Oragnien, z.p. 1654, Kn. 7551, p. 8, 27-29; 
anonymous, Copye | van de onkosten, gedaen by Willem [...] van Orangnien, in’t vverven van twee heyr-legers, te 
weten, van’t iaer 1568. ende 1572. om te thoonen de abuysen begaen in de laetsten gheemaneerde deductie, uyt-gegeven 
by de [...] Staten van Hollandt, Amsterdam 1654, Kn. 7553; States of Zeeland, Copia van de resolutie ende 
motiven der [...] Staten van Zeelandt, teghens d’acte van seclusie, by de welcke de provintie van Hollandt 
den [...] prince van Orangien [...] hebben uyt-ghesloten, 1654, Kn. 7554, fol. a3v-a4r.
47 Th. Birch (ed.), A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe, vol. ii, London 1742, p. 497; H.H. Rowen, 
John de Witt, grand pensionary of Holland, 1625-1672, Princeton (nj) 1978, p. 235.
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that such a negative resolution and engagement is sometimes necessary?’48 The ‘nega-
tive resolution’ De Witt referred to was the States of Holland’s decision in April 1581 
to abjure the king, Philip ii of Spain, a decision that the States General had adopted 
in their Oath of Abjuration a few months later. By likening the Abjuration of 1581 to 
the Exclusion of 1654, De Witt reinterpreted a canonical episode in the history of the 
Revolt and cleverly disentangled the abjuration of Philip ii from the Orangist associa-
tions the event had acquired over time. The references to the Revolt in the Deduction, as 
well as the fact that the tract was publically recited in the highest political assembly of 
the Republic, demonstrate that De Witt recognized the political potency and canonical 
status of narratives about the past rebellion against Philip ii.
The Union of Utrecht (1579), as has been explained above, was an object of con-
tested interpretations because of its constitutional importance. De Witt and the States 
of Holland argued that the Union confirmed the independence of the confederated 
provinces, whereas the other provinces claimed that by accepting the Act of Exclu-
sion, Holland had exceeded the Union’s constitutional bounds. De Witt also used less 
constitutionally relevant references to the Revolt to show that Holland’s acquiescence 
in the Exclusion was lawful. He asserted, for instance, that it was not the Exclusion 
Act that had caused disunity within the Republic – as some provinces claimed – but 
that ‘the Netherlands were foremost brought into a state of discord by the Heads’, i.e. 
princes.49 De Witt drew from the sixteenth-century past to substantiate this assertion. 
He briefly touched upon ‘the old histories and chronicles’, which ‘nowadays still show 
us with fright in what ways our ancestors have lived under the Dukes / Counts / 
Bishops / and Lords in continuous dissension and disagreement’.50 Evoking the public 
memory of Burgundian and Habsburg rulers, with particular attention to the persecu-
tion of heretics by Emperor Charles v and King Philip ii, the author arrived at ‘those 
times / which are actually applicable to these’: the period of the 1580s when according 
to De Witt all domestic troubles were caused not by the many threats of war but by 
the Dutch princely rulers themselves.51 The Anjou debacle, mentioned above, was an 
episode supporters of True Freedom referred to in order to prove that in the past it 
had always been ambitious rulers who jeopardized the peace of the land. Similarly, after 
Anjou, Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, was appointed governor, and he, too, refused 
48 J. de Witt, Deductie, ofte declaratie van de Staten van Hollandt ende West-Vrieslandt [...] tot justificatie van’t ver-
leenen van seeckere acte van seclusie, raeckende ‘t employ vanden heere prince van Oraigne [...] op den vierden mey 1654 
ghepasseert, The Hague 1654, p. 14: ‘heeft niet de alderimporteniste saecke die / by de Menschen memorie / 
ofte geheuchenisse van historiën / in dese Nederlanden voorgevallen is ons gheleert dat soodanige nega-
tieve resolutie ende verbintenissen somwijlen nootsaeckelijk is?’
49 Ibidem, p. 59: ‘dat de Nederlanden meest in oneenigheyt zijn ghebracht door de Hoofden’.
50 Ibidem, p. 61-62: ‘De oude Historien / ende Chronijcquen doen ons noch huyden ’s daechs met ver-
schrickinghe sien in wat voeghen ons Voor-ouderen onder Hertoghen / Graven / Bisschoppen / ende 
Heeren/ niet alleen in continuele dissentien / ende oneenicheden hebben geleeft’.
51 Ibidem, p. 62: ‘die tijden / die in desen eyghentlijck zijn applicabel’.
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to settle for the power conferred on him by the States General and instead tried to 
centralize his authority at the expense of local privileges.52
Inasmuch as the malgovernance of over-ambitious princely rulers could torment a 
country, De Witt explained, the death of such a ruler could be a great cause for relief. 
Just as William ii’s death had been a blessing in disguise, the death of William of Orange 
should not be seen as a tragedy according to the grand pensionary. In 1584, the States 
of Holland had intended to grant Prince William i the sovereignty of the province. But 
while they were drafting this proposal, Balthasar Gérard – a Catholic zealot from the 
Franche-Comté – assassinated the prince. De Witt looked back: ‘Look / a dishonour -
able and Godless Murderer was conceived who / being bribed by the Enemies of the 
Land / took the life of that glorious Prince’.53 The grand pensionary condemned the 
murder but added that despite the fact that the country was robbed of its leader, ‘God 
Almighty has nonetheless created light from such deep darkness / and not only kept 
the State standing / but also preserved its Inhabitants / and guarded them from the 
new subjection they were already being rushed into’.54 Here, De Witt attributed the 
success of the Revolt to divine intervention in order to downplay the role that Oran-
gists ascribed to William of Orange.
Finally, De Witt argued that William of Orange’s descendants Maurice, Frederick 
Henry and William ii were ‘honoured / as if they had been lawful Princes of the 
Land’.55 Considering that, formally, in the Dutch Republic they had never been more 
than stadholders, the princes of Orange claimed more respect than they were entitled 
to. He addressed ‘the sensitive reproof / and emotional reproach of ingratitude / and 
underestimation towards the mentioned House of Orange’ and rejected the argument 
that gratitude towards the prince of Orange and his forefathers is incompatible with 
the Exclusion.56 He probably used the words ‘sensitive’ and ‘emotional’ in acknowled-
gement of the emotions that the past could stir up. For this reason indeed it seems De 
Witt felt compelled to add the disclaimer that although Maurice, Frederick Henry and 
William ii deserved to be criticized, the States of Holland ‘nevertheless have to confess 
that the Lord Prince William the Old / great-grandfather of the present Prince of 
Orange deserves to be considered differently’.57 He challenged the States of Friesland’s 
52 Ibidem, p. 63.
53 Ibidem, p. 50: ‘Siet / daer werdt een eer- ende Godtloos Moordenaer verweckt die / van ’s Landts 
Vyanden omgekocht wesende / dien glorieusen Prince het leven berooft’.
54 Ibidem, p. 50: ‘soo heeft nochtans Godt Almachtich uyt soo dicke duysternisse een helder licht ghe-
schept / ende niet alleenlijck den Staedt genadichlijck ende wonderbaerlijck staende ghehouden / maer 
oock d’Ingesetenen van dien ghepreserveert / ende behoedt voor de nieuwe subjectie daer inne de selve 
albereyts genoechsaem waren geprecipiteert’.
55 Ibidem, p. 73: ‘ghe-eert / even als of sy wettighe Princen van den Lande waren gheweest’.
56 Ibidem, p. 71: ‘het sensibel verwijt / ende de ghevoelijke reproche van ondanckbaerheydt / ende mes-
cognaissance teghens ‘tgemelte Huys van Oraigne’.
57 Ibidem, p. 74: ‘Soo moeten haer Ed: Groot Mo: nochtans bekennen dat / ten regarde dat den Heere 
Prince Willem d’oude / over-Groot-Vader van den jegenwoordigen Prince van Oraigne / andere conside-
ratie zijn vallende’.
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accusation of ingratitude and asked what they had done when William i died. In 1584, 
they had refused to employ the prince’s son Maurice as stadholder, instead granting the 
stadholderate to William of Orange’s nephew, William Louis. De Witt jeered: ‘where, 
at that time, were those who now write and go on so much about due gratitude?’58
The Deduction is only one example of the States Party’s frequent use of references 
to the Revolt and of the strategies they employed to disconnect narratives about the 
conflict from pro-Orange associations. In many other publications, adherents of True 
Freedom made similar efforts.59
Conclusion
This article has analyzed discussions about the past but in full awareness that these 
discussions do not by themselves change the course of history; political arguments 
and rhetoric need to be followed by ‘real’ actions in order to make a lasting impact on 
society. A remark of the English Ambassador in The Hague, John Thurloe, illustrates 
the importance of the political context for the success of having one’s interpretation 
of events accepted by others. He observed in 1654, just after the publication of Johan 
de Witt’s Deduction, that:
There are some, who do prognosticate to Holland some harm from this apology [i.e. the Deduction]; 
as in like manner in the year 1617, when [Olden]Barnevelt published his apology,60 exposing himself 
at that time to the assaults and insulting pens of so many famous writers, who writ against him.
But the states of Holland have supporters, which Barneveldt had not; for Barneveldt and the states 
of Holland were not masters of the militia, as the states of Holland are at present. Secondly, those 
of Holland are and will be back’d and assisted by England.61
Past experience taught Dutch people that a conflict with a prince of Orange was 
risky. Oldenbarnevelt had, after all, lost his head over a conflict with Prince Maurice. 
However, the political context had changed radically from 1617 onwards: the relatively 
powerful stadholderate in the period 1617-1650 had been replaced by the stadholderless 
58 Ibidem, p. 74: ‘Waer waren als doen die gene die nu soo veel van schuldige danckbaerheydt schrijven 
ende vrijven?’
59 See for example the following succinct booklets: anonymous, Zeeuwze ratel, geroert tusschen dry persoonen, 
een Hollander, Zeeuvv en Hagenaar, over het uitsluiten en deporteren van een stadhouder en generaal, Middelburg 
1654, Kn. 7564; anonymous, Noodig bericht aan alle oprechte patriotten [...] nopende, dat den prince van Oranjen, 
noch de grave van Nassouw [...] geen oorsaak zijn tot ons aller behoudenis, Amsterdam 1654, Kn. 7567; anony-
mous, Wederlegginge vande valsche verkeerde rekeninge en kalculatie, onlangs in druck uytgekomen, aengaende de 
pretense-onkosten die gedaen souden wesen by Willem de i, s.l. 1655, Kn. 7662.
60 Johan van Oldenbarnevelt (1547-1619) had been Advocate of Holland, a similar office to the one held 
by Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt. Oldenbarnevelt, like De Witt, came into conflict with the house of 
Orange.
61 Birch (ed.), A collection of the State Papers of John Thurloe (n. 47), vol. ii, p. 496.
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regime examined in this article. By the 1650s it had become less dangerous to criticize 
the Orange dynasty in the present and trivialize its achievements in the past.
Yet, despite these political changes, the dominant Orangist narrative about the 
Revolt was remarkably resilient and grew even stronger as supporters of the house of 
Orange became more outspoken in their propaganda. In 1662, when discussions about 
the stadholderate reached a high point, Pieter de la Court noted the continued dif-
ficulty supporters of True Freedom experienced in trying to circumvent the Orangist 
frame of history.62 An adherent of the States Party, he wrote the preface to an edition 
of the history of the Dutch Revolt by Viglius van Aytta (1507-1577). Viglius had been 
a member of the Council of State, an important counsellor to Philip ii of Spain when 
the Revolt broke out, and an outspoken critic of the leader of the Revolt William i of 
Orange. Prince William and his supporters, De la Court alleged, ultimately won the 
war and this meant:
that in narrating the history of the troubles, our historiographers as subjects of the Princes, put on 
the stage their brave deeds and exaggerated them, concealing in the meantime, and trivialising as 
much as possible, their vices and follies.63
The same could be said, mutatis mutandis, for the Habsburg Southern Netherlands. De 
la Court argued that South-Netherlandish historians were driven by motives simi-
lar to those of their Northern colleagues, and that ‘in describing the troubles, [they] 
trivialise the vices and follies of the King of Spain, in order to be able to blame the 
troubles on the Netherlandish nobles, and particularly on the Princes of Orange’.64 De 
la Court attributed Prince William’s heroic reputation in the Republic not so much to 
his exceptional skill and courage as to the outcome of the war: the separation between 
the Northern and Southern Netherlands. Interestingly, De la Court toned down Wil-
liam of Orange’s glorious war record by presenting the prince’s heroic reputation as 
simply the result of political and military circumstances outside his control. Without 
risking accusation of a lack of patriotism, De la Court could thus justify the stadhol-
derless political system that he envisaged.65
Although De la Court’s perspective appears distinctly modern to readers in the 
twenty-first century, his relativistic approach to the past would probably not have 
appealed to the average early modern inhabitant of the Republic. Above all, his 
62 Stern, Orangism (n. 4), p. 159.
63 P. de la Court, ‘Voor-reden’ to Viglius van Aytta, ‘Grondig berigt van ’t Nederlands oproer zo onder de 
hertogin van Parma, als den hertog van Alba. Beschreven in ’t François’, in: P. de la Court (ed.), Historie der 
gravelike regering in Holland, z.p. 1662, p. 209: ‘dat Onse Historie-Schrijvers als onderdaanen der selver, in 
het verhaalen der gemelde Troubelen, alle de kloeke daaden der Princen op het tooneel bragten, ende die 
booven de waarheid vergrooteden, verswijgende onderentusschen ofte verkleinende soo veel doenelik, der 
selven ondeugden ende dwaasheden’.
64 Ibidem, p. 209-210: ‘in het beschrijven der gemelde Troublen […] de ondeugden ende dwaasheden der 
Koningen van Hispanien verzwijgen ofte verkleinen, om alle den schuld der zelve Troublen, ten laste de 
Nederlandse Heeren, en bysonderlijk op de Princen van Oranjen te konnen leggen’.
65 See also Geyl, ‘Het stadhouderschap’ (n. 4), p. 12.
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explanation further demonstrates that every time anti-Orangist political activists 
deployed the Revolt in support of their agenda, they first needed to address the Oran-
gist slant of most historical narratives about the conflict.
This article has shown that propagandists of the States Party could not easily disen-
tangle themselves from the Orangist narrative. There are two important explanations 
for the use of historical references to the Revolt by supporters of   True Freedom. In 
the first place, the historical canon was recognized by many people as the foundation 
narrative of the Republic. In that capacity it was an important frame of reference that 
adherents of the States Party were unable to ignore in discussions about the Republic’s 
legal constitution in the 1650s and 60s. The problem, however, was that supporters of 
the house of Orange had in the preceding decades successfully claimed the legacy 
of the Revolt as their moral property. As a result, recognition of William of Orange’s 
achievements became difficult to reconcile with denying the stadholderate to the prin-
ce’s great-grandson William iii.
Secondly, a polemicist who appropriated the popular historical frame of reference 
about the Revolt effectively compelled the opposition to do the same. Orangists accu-
sed the States Party of ingratitude and a lack of patriotism. The only way to counter 
these accusations – and this is also an explanation of how the States Party circumvented 
the Orangist slant of the dominant narrative – was to challenge the Orangist inter-
pretation of the past and replace it with an anti-Orangist alternative. The existence 
of a popular and dominant interpretation of the past – in this case notably the cele-
bration of William i of Orange as a national hero – did not preclude the existence of 
other interpretations, but it did force people with alternative interpretations to position 
themselves against the canon, compelling them constantly to debunk their opponent’s 
reading of the past.
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